The Asian Reaction to the West’s Davos Realignment
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Imaad Nasir
London, UK
Amidst the furore of the 2026 World Economic Forum, one speech stood out. Taking the world by storm, Canadian PM Mark Carney’s address recognised that an old-world order had finally been annihilated by confrontation, blatant self-interest and calculated aggression. Western-based analysts hailed the moment as epoch defining-a speech that would shock fellow European states into action. But the reaction of others – particularly emerging and developed Asian nations – has indicated that it would be naïve for Europe to believe that decades of pro-American foreign policy can be swept away with a handful of gestures. Indeed, the response from the two Asian heavyweights of geopolitics – India and China – exemplifies substantial cynicism regarding the West’s latest move, as well as the varying strategic reactions to Europe’s desire to build bridges with Asia.
Indians divided on Carney, as New Delhi capitalises on the moment
Opinion in India has broadly favoured Carney’s new position. Undoubtedly, this is because of general goodwill towards the Canadian PM, who has reengaged with India following a period of exceptionally poor relations between India and Canada. Following the assassination of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar (alleged by India to be associated with the militant Khalistan Tigers Force) in Canada in 2023, Canada expelled top Indian diplomats after determining that India sponsored Nijjar’s death (a claim India denies). Under PM Justin Trudeau, little headway was made in returning relations to normal. However, Carney has largely restored strong ties, signalled above all by inviting Indian PM Narendra Modi to G7 talks in Alberta in June.
Indian analysts have thus rallied to Carney’s defence, declaring that his new vision for cooperation between middle powers aligns with India’s foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, others have accepted the existence of that same alignment, but criticised Europe for its seeming hypocrisy. For when India pursued ‘multi-alignment’ – hedging its bets through relations with different partners – it was criticised for standing on the fence by the EU. Now, Canada moves to do the same, it seems to be lauded for it.
Indeed, the parallels between the Canadian and Indian approaches are suspiciously strong. In February 2025 at the Munich Security Conference, Indian foreign minister S Jaishankar declared that India does have multiple partners, noting that ‘It is very hard to have a unidimensional relationship’ with any one state, and that the era of reliance on any single superpower is ‘behind us.’ His interviewer defined Indian multi-alignment as selecting different allies for different topics, something which Jaishankar did not deny. Sharing the same values, Carney said in his Davos speech that Canada would pursue ‘different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests’ and that ‘allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.’
Whether Europe’s positive reaction to the Canadian call for multialignment is something to be mocked for its hypocrisy or to be lauded for its advantages for Asia divides Indians. But New Delhi’s stance on the matter is clear. It is capitalising on the moment to strengthen bonds with Western middle powers. Carney plans a visit to India in February, hoping to boost negotiations for an Indo-Canadian trade deal. Meanwhile, on 26th of January, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attended India’s Republic Day ceremony as guest of honour, with the two sides having signed the ‘mother of all deals’: an Indo-European free trade agreement decades in the making.
For the Modi administration the time is ripe to pursue these new trade avenues. Relations with the US have struggled since the advent of Trump 2.0 due to three factors; firstly, Trump’s protectionism and implementation of tariffs; secondly, his specific targeting of India because of its purchase of Russian oil; and thirdly, Pakistan’s widely perceived mastery in dealing with the Trump administration. Simultaneously, however, India’s economy remains strong with stable interest rates, reduced inflation, high growth (forecast to reach 7.4% in 2026), significant deregulation, and a reduced deficit. Thus, India currently has both the weakened ties with prior allies necessary to push it to new partners and the economic conditions needed to pull those new partners towards it. With Europe and Canada now similarly aware of the necessity to diversify, the next three years might see Delhi, Brussels and Ottawa move closer together, even if popular opinion in India remains cynical about Western hypocrisy.
Beijing scorns an isolated Europe
Beijing has remained similarly cynical about Europe’s intentions in this new paradigm. According to the Economist, Chinese officials continue to criticise the difficulty with which European leaders confront Trump even when those very leaders talk of European independence and self-reliance.
Neither does there seem to have been a popular public reaction in China in favour of Carney. Instead, the dominant recent narrative on Chinese social media outlets has been of using America’s operations in Venezuela as a model for China to coerce the Taiwanese government into submission.
China has not chosen to capitalise on the American withdrawal from European affairs in the same way as it has done elsewhere. Notably, China filled the vacuum of America’s reduced influence in the Middle East in recent years through strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with its mediation of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran. By contrast, when it comes to Europe and the Atlantic, Beijing seems content to watch Western middle-powers flounder. Undoubtedly, this is because China does not see the West as a reliable long-term partner. Perhaps Beijing recognises that a Democratic victory in the 2028 presidential elections might reassure European leaders enough about American foreign policy that the continent would again become over reliant on the US.
Despite China’s caution, European powers are flocking to Beijing. Carney recently visited China, extensively promoting the trip and touting the strategic partnership signed between the two states. With the trip directly preceding the events of Davos, the message was obvious: Canada was hedging its bets, conducting the ‘risk management’ that Carney spoke of. Similarly to Carney, PM Keir Starmer is in Beijing (at the time of writing) on an official visit, in the first such visit for eight years.
The reaction to Western overtures has been muted. President Xi’s overarching message to Canada was for any renewed relationship to be underpinned by respect – implicitly, Xi is conditioning any new partnerships with Europe or Canada on reduced criticism of human rights abuses in China. With respect to Britain, few hold much hope for concrete benefits from Starmer’s trip. The British PM’s visit will follow a long-running controversy over the construction of a large new Chinese embassy in London, with fears that the building could be used to spy on communications in the British capital. The trip is expected to achieve little more than promote British goods and business in Beijing. Thus, it is clear that China is content to watch Europe struggle to maintain its influence in world affairs without the support of a traditionally allied American government.
Conclusion
Carney’s speech at Davos touted a ‘rupture in the world order.’ Its dramatic tone and frank admission of Western hypocrisy in applying international law was squarely aimed at wooing the giants of Asia, with their large manufacturing bases, markets for foreign goods, rapid economic growth and openness to trade. But Europe and Canada’s position in this new world order is far from assured. Public opinion in India and China exemplifies classical hostility or ambivalence towards the Western powers–the consequence of decades of geopolitical tensions and centuries of colonial subjugation. Beijing remains wary of saving Europe in its moment of desperation, for fear of preserving the influence of states that have historically criticised the Chinese government.
A faint glimmer of hope exists in the Indo-European ‘mother of all deals,’ which might harken closer relations between one of the wealthiest and one of the most populous regions of the world. But the depressing reality for Europe remains that, after decades of alignment with the US and a divisive international order, a dramatic turn to face eastwards has only been met with limited enthusiasm in New Delhi, and none in Beijing.
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